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Objectives: This study aims to develop a method for calculating infection time
lines for disease outbreaks on farms was developed using the 2010/2011 foot-
and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in the Republic of Korea.
Methods: Data on farm demography, the detection date of FMD, the clinical
history for the manifestation of lesions, the presence of antibodies against FMD
virus (including antibodies against the structural and nonstructural proteins of
serotype O), vaccination status (O1 Manisa strain), the number of reactors and
information on the slaughter of infected animals were utilized in this method.
Results: Based on estimates of the most likely infection date, a cumulative
detection probability that an infected farm would be identified on a specific day
was determined. Peak infection was observed between late December and early
January, but peak detection occurred in mid-January. The early detection
probability was highest for pigs, followed by cattle (dairy, then beef) and small
ruminants. Nearly 90% of the infected pig farms were detected by Day 11 post-
infection while 13 days were required for detection for both dairy and beef cattle
farms, and 21 days were necessary for small ruminant (goat and deer) farms. On
average, 8.1  3.1 days passed prior to detecting the presence of FMD virus on a
farm. The interval between infection and detection of FMD was inversely asso-
ciated with the intensity of farming.
Conclusion: The results of our study emphasize the importance of intensive
clinical inspection, which is the quickest method of detecting FMD infection and
minimizing the damage caused by an epidemic.ted under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License (http://
0) which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
roperly cited.
ase Control and Prevention. Published by Elsevier Korea LLC. All rights reserved.
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Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is one of the most
contagious viral diseases of cloven-hoofed animals and
occurs sporadically and endemically in many parts of
the world except for Europe, North America, and Oce-
ania [1]. An outbreak of FMD results in economic losses
because of the control measures used (e.g., movement
restrictions, vaccination, and slaughter) and decreased
productivity, both of which affect the entire livestock
industry. When an infected or suspected farm is detec-
ted, a thorough investigation should be made of all an-
imals, vehicles, personnel, and materials moved on and
off the farm for the duration of the risk period associated
with the introduction and transmission of the virus [2].
Epidemiological data should be used to construct con-
tact networks between farms according to contact
tracing and the estimated infection time line. Infection
time lines include estimates of the temporal windows
during which a farm was most likely to have been
infected and the infectious period surrounding the
infected farms. During the 2010/2011 FMD epidemic in
the Republic of Korea, emergency vaccination was
implemented 1 month after detection of the index case;
this policy ultimately became a vaccine-to-live policy.
Vaccinations were initiated on cattle farms within the
outbreak areas, but were later extended to include all
cloven-hoofed animals in Korea. As a result, vaccination
status differed with the time of infection, time of
detection, animal species, and farm type. Considering
the diverse vaccination conditions of the infected farms,
all available information, including serological test re-
sults, clinical manifestation, and disease dynamics,
should be integrated to estimate the infection time line.
Moreover, a standard protocol should be developed to
apply consistent criteria to each infected farm. In this
paper, we present a method for calculating the infection
time line at the farm level using the 2010/2011 FMD
epidemic in Korea as a reference.2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Data on the infected farms
This study included 3748 farms on which at least one
serological reactor was confirmed during the FMD
epidemic of November 2010 to April 2011. The data
used in this study were extracted from the FMD data-
base of the Animal Plant and Fisheries Quarantine and
Inspection Agency and included the following: farm
demography, the detection date of FMD, the clinical
history for the manifestation of lesions, the presence of
antibodies against the structural protein (SP) or
nonstructural protein (NSP) of FMD serotype O,
vaccination status (O1 Manisa strain), the number of
reactors, and records on the slaughter of infected ani-
mals. Farms were classified by type according to themajor species of animal farmed. The study population
consisted of 1425 beef cattle, 509 dairy cattle, 1727 pig,
44 goat, and 43 deer farms. The FMD database has been
described elsewhere [3].2.2. The most likely time of infection
The criteria used to estimate the most likely time of
infection were prioritized according to the chronological
dynamics of FMD virus infection in animals: viremia,
clinical lesions, and antibody response [4,5]. The method
used to estimate the infection time differed according to
vaccination status. However, the presence of NSP anti-
bodies was given the highest priority regardless of
vaccination status. If NSP antibodies were detected in at
least one animal on a farm, the first animal in this herd
was estimated to have been infected at least 11 days
(pigs), 13 days (cattle), or 15 days (small ruminants) prior
to detection. The second priority for the non-vaccinated
farms was the presence of SP antibodies. If SP anti-
bodies were detected, the first infection had to have
occurred at least 6 days (pigs), 8 days (cattle), or 10 days
(small ruminants) prior to detection. These intervals were
inferred from the literature [6e8]. If neither NSP nor SP
antibodies were detected, then the infection time was
calculated as the age of the oldest clinical lesion plus the
incubation period (5 days for cattle, 4 days for pigs, and 6
days for small ruminants [9]) subtracted from the date of
detection, which was the same date that the examination
for clinical lesions was performed. The age of the clinical
lesions was determined using the “Foot and Mouth Dis-
ease Aging of Lesions” criteria [10]. On subclinically
infected farms, the incubation period was estimated
backwards from the time of detection. When several re-
actors were present on a farm, species-specific simulated
patterns of within-herd transmission were also consid-
ered [1,11,12]. For vaccinated farms, the second priority
was the manifestation of clinical signs. For subclinically
infected farms, the incubation period was subtracted from
the date of detection. On the vaccinated farms, the pres-
ence of SP antibodies was considered only if the reactors
showed clinical lesions within 3 days of vaccination.
When clinical signs of FMD were observed 4e7 days
postvaccination, the infection dates were independently
estimated based on the presence of SP antibody and
clinical signs. Then, the two estimated dates (with and
without the presence of SP antibodies) were compared,
and the earliest date of the two estimates was considered
the infection date. For farms that were detected more than
14 days postvaccination, the presence of SP antibodies
was ignored when determining the infection time.2.3. Statistical analysis of the time distribution
All analyses in the present study were performed at
the farm level and separately according to farm type.
Taking into account the small number of infected farms
for goats (n Z 44) and deer (n Z 43), these two farm
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nants” was generated.
The cumulative probability that a farm would be
detected on a specific day t was estimated as a detection
density function, f ðTmtÞ:
f ðTmtÞZSðTtÞqt
bt
where SðTtÞ was the cumulative proportion not-
detecting, qt was the conditional proportion detecting,
and bt was the width of the interval, which was 1 day in
this study. The cumulative detection density function
was calculated by summing the detection density func-
tion from time t Z 0 to t Z 1. The detection density
function and statistical analyses were performed using
NCSS 2007 (NCSS, Kaysville, Utah, USA).
The distribution of data for the time interval between
the most likely time of infection and detection was fit to
the probability density function using maximum likeli-
hood estimates. Goodness of fit was evaluated using the
AndersoneDarling test because the time interval was a
continuous scale. The estimation of the distribution was
performed using @RISK 5.0 (Palisade Inc., Newfield,
NY, USA).
3. Results
The daily number of farms infected and detected
showed a similar distribution pattern. A 5e10-day gap was
observed between infection and detection of the infected
farms. However, the shape of the detected distribution was
less smooth than the infected distribution for the period
from late January 2011 to February 2011. The infection
peak was observed between late December and early
January, while detection peaked inmid-January (Figure 1).
The cumulative probability of detection increased
with elapsed time and showed an inverse-exponential
curve for pigs and a sigmoidal shape for small rumi-
nants. The probability of early detection was the highest
for pig farms, followed by dairy and beef cattle farms,
and small ruminant farms. Almost 90% of the infected
farms were detected by Day 11 postinfection for pig
farms, by Day 13 for both dairy and beef cattle farms,
and by Day 21 for small ruminant farms (Figure 2).Figure 1. Epidemic curves showing the number of foot-and-m
detected farms (blue) by day.A mean  standard deviation of 8.1  3.1 days
passed prior to the detection of FMD infection on a farm,
which we defined as a “detection delay”. The detection
delays were shortest for pig farms (7.1  2.5 days) and
longest for deer farms where a large variation was also
observed (14.4  8.1 days). These time intervals did not
present any kind of temporal variation or trend. The
coefficient of correlation (r) between the detection delay
and the number of days elapsed since the start of the
epidemic was 0.02 (pZ 0.99). However, the detection
delays were significantly different relative to farm type
(F-ratio in the analysis of variance, ANOVA Z 202.10,
p < 0.001). The best fit distributions were Weibull for
beef cattle, Pearson type 5 for dairy cattle, Beta General
for pigs, and Normal for small ruminants (Table 1).
4. Discussion
Clinical signs are the most convenient indicators of
an outbreak and can be related to the progression of
disease. In the case of FMD, the most likely time of
infection can be estimated on the basis of the oldest
clinical lesion in the herd. Such estimations have been
used to construct transmission pathways [13,14], un-
derstand the pattern of virus excretion [15,16], assess the
efficacy of control measures [17], simulate modeling
programs [18], and identify the risk factors associated
with disease transmission [19]. However, the use of
clinical signs is not always feasible because the mani-
festation of clinical signs is not always obvious; symp-
toms are less clear in sheep, goats, and deer, for
example, than in pigs and cattle [3]. In addition, vacci-
nation against FMD may prevent animals from devel-
oping clinical lesions even when infected [20]. It is also
possible that the earliest infected animals in a herd are
missed until a greater number of animals show clinical
signs [15]. If an infected farm can be detected prior to
the development of clinical signs (i.e., during the incu-
bation period) through active serological surveillance in
association with contact with an infected farm, then
relying on clinical lesions is no longer necessary [3,21].
In our method, the detection of NSP antibodies was, for
various reasons, the top priority when estimating the
infection date. It was possible to distinguish vaccinatedouth disease (FMD) infected farms (red) and the number of
Figure 2. Cumulative detection density function describing whether a farm would be detected on a specific day following the
occurrence of the first foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) infected animal.
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linked immuno sorbent assay (ELISA) using 3ABC
[22] or 3AB [23]. Moreover, SP antibodies develop
quicker than NSP antibodies [8]. The seroconversion
times reported in the literature are 5 days postinfection
for SP antibodies in calves and 10 days postinfection for
NSP antibodies in pigs, cattle, and calves [6e8]. Thus,
using antibody detection as a criterion was plausible
because all 3748 infected farms were confirmed by
laboratory diagnosis. However, not all animals sus-
pected of being infected were tested for the presence of
antibodies. Our protocol remains reliable, however,
because animals showing the most severe clinical le-
sions were purposefully chosen for specimen collection
to detect the reactor [24].
The time interval between initial infection and
detection ranged from 6 days to 15 days in modeling
studies [3,25]. However, these estimations include un-
certainties because of the assumptions used in their
calculation. In the present study, the time courses used
to estimate infection time (e.g., latency, incubation, and
seroconversion for SP and NSP antibodies) were shorter
for pigs than for cattle or small ruminants, which might
influence the detection delays in our estimation. This
influence appears negligible, however, based on our
previous work in which the interval between infection
and the detection of clinical signs was shortest in pigs,Table 1. Descriptions of the estimated interval (days) from inf
Farm type
Mean (SD)
Median (Q1, Q3)
Beef cattle 9.1 (3.0) We
8 (6, 12) (a
Dairy cattle 8.3 (3.1) Pea
8 (6, 11) (a
Pigs 7.1 (2.5) Be
7 (5, 9) (a1
m
Small ruminants 12.6 (4.9) No
15 (8, 16) (M
SD Z standard deviation.and the manifestation of clinical signs was independent
of vaccination status [3]. Although the parameters of
infection and detection could change during the
epidemic [24], such change was not considered because
the time elapsed from the start of the epidemic did not
affect the detection delay, and no correlation was
observed between detection delay and the start of the
epidemic in the present study (r Z 0.02, p Z 0.99).
Detection delays appeared to be associated with
within-herd transmission, the type of animal and herd,
and the size and density of the herd. Transmission of
FMD within an animal herd is influenced by the viability
and virulence of the virus strain, and FMD is not easily
controlled. Temperature and pH are well-known de-
terminants of FMD virus survival, and the virus is
capable of remaining viable under cool conditions [26].
In hot climates, direct transmission through the move-
ment of animals is believed to be the most important
factor [27], but in cold weather, such as during winter in
Korea when the average temperature in January can
drop as low as 7C [28], the disinfection of inorganic
substances (e.g., vehicles, materials, etc.) can be diffi-
cult. Indirect mechanical transmission of the virus,
which can persist in the environment, would be the main
concern for biosecurity and disease control. Another
factor to consider is human (farmer) behavior [29]. In an
intensive production system, the indirect contactection to detection for infected farms according to farm type
Distribution
(parameters)
AndersoneDarling
statistic
ibull 27.89
Z 3.34, b Z 10.12)
rson 5 16.92
Z 8.61, b Z 63.5)
ta General 21.12
Z 1.66, a2 Z 4.16,
in Z 2.90, max Z 17.52)
rmal 3.30
ean Z 12.59, SD Z 4.94)
Infection window for the Korean FMD outbreak 131between animals is mainly the result of human activities.
Thus, in Korea, the disease might have spread faster
among animals in intensive farming systems such as
pigs and dairy cattle. Moreover, detection may have
occurred earlier than in an extensive production system.
The probability of detecting FMD therefore seems to be
largely dependent on the frequency and intensity of
observations made by the farmers, and thus a result of
human action. An example of how the risk of infection
could be controlled through clinical observation was
observed during the FMD outbreak in the UK. As the
movement of animals is considered the highest risk
factor for disease transmission, during the 2007 FMD
outbreaks in England all animals intended for shipment
to Scotland were clinically inspected. These inspections
reduced the estimated probability of missing infected
ovine farms by half within 15 days [30].
In conclusion, this study describes an essential but
often overlooked step in field epidemiology. Our pro-
tocol for estimating the infection time of FMD virus on
a farm was designed to measure the time required to
detect the infection, which directly influences the effi-
cacy of control measures. The interval between infection
and detection of FMD was inversely associated with
the intensity of farming. Our findings emphasize the
importance of intensive clinical inspections as the
quickest method for detecting FMD infections and
minimizing the damage caused by an epidemic. The
method of estimating the infection window proposed in
this study can be used to improve the accuracy of
emergency responses in case of an FMD outbreak.Acknowledgments
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